The Economics of Schooling in a Divided Society by Borooah, Vani & Knox, Colin
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The Economics of Schooling in a Divided
Society
Vani Borooah and Colin Knox
University of Ulster, University of Ulster
2015
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/78124/
MPRA Paper No. 78124, posted 6 April 2017 07:02 UTC
1 
 
Chapter 6 
Inequality, Segregation, and Underachievement in Northern Ireland’s Post-Primary Schools 
6.1. Introduction 
 The focus of this chapter is the highly unequal and segregated system of schooling provision 
in Northern Ireland.  As Table 6.1 shows, of the 24,147 Year 12 pupils in Northern Ireland in 2013, 
79% obtained 5+A*-C GCSEs and 60% obtained ‘good’ GCSEs in the form 5+A*-C GCSEs (E&M).  
The latter figure compares favourably with the 59% of pupils in England who got good GCSEs in 
2013.  
However, masking this headline achievement rate of 60% of pupils obtaining good GCSEs 
are two disturbing features which are often swept under the carpet. First, the 60% good GCSEs pass 
rate was a weighted average of a superlative performance by Northern Ireland’s 68 grammar schools, 
with a 94% of their Year 12 pupils obtaining good GCSEs pass rate (that is, 5+A*-C (E&M) GCSEs), 
and an undistinguished performance by its 137 secondary schools, with only 38% of their Year 12 
pupils obtaining good GCSEs.  There is thus a 56 percentage point (pp) gap between Northern 
Ireland’s grammar and secondary schools in the proportions of their pupils obtaining good GCSEs 
and, as worryingly, this gap has shown little sign of reducing over time: the proportions in 2009 were, 
respectively, 94% and 35%. 
Taken collectively, Northern Ireland’s post-primary secondary schools fail to meet the 
minimum acceptable standard for post-primary schools in England of 40% of Year 12 pupils 
obtaining 5+A*-C (E&M) GCSE passes.  However, this collective failure masks an even deeper 
failure at the level of individual schools. Of Northern Ireland’s 137 secondary schools, 82 (or 60%) 
performed below the ‘40% standard’ and, in these underperforming schools, the average proportion of 
Year 12 pupils obtaining 5+A*-C (E&M) GCSE passes was just 28% while, in the secondary schools 
that were not underperforming it was 51%. 
The second worrying feature is that the attainment gap in Northern Ireland between FSM and 
non-FSM pupils with, respectively, 34% and 68% of pupils in each group obtaining good GCSEs in 
2013. This attainment gap of 34pp contrasts with the attainment gap of only 13pp for inner London 
where 54% of FSM, and 67% of non-FSM, school leavers obtained good GCSEs (Greaves et. al., 
2014).  So, there are three aspects to performance inequality within Northern Ireland’s schooling 
system: (i) inequality between grammar and secondary schools; (ii) inequality between secondary 
schools; and (iii) inequality between FSM and non-FSM pupils. 
   
Table 6.1: Salient Features of Northern Ireland’s Post-Primary Schooling System, 2013 
 Number 
of 
Schools 
Total 
Enrolment  
 
Year 12 
enrolment 
Year 14 
enrolment 
FSM 
pupils 
SEN 
pupils 
5+A*-C 5+A*-C 
(E&M) 
2+A*-E 3+A*-C 
Total 
Schools 
205 142,960 24,147 13,743 19.0 19.8 78.8 59.5 98.0 65.3 
Grammar 
Schools: 
68 62,599 9,403 8,303 7.4 7.9 97.3 93.9 99.6 77.1 
Catholic 
Grammars 
30 27,661 4,017 3,741 10.2 8.9 98.4 94.9 99.5 80.1 
Protestant 
Grammars 
38 34,938 5,386 4,562 5.1 7.1 96.4 93.1 99.6 74.7 
Secondary 
Schools: 
137 80,361 14,744 5,440 28.0 28.9 67.0 37.5 95.5 46.6 
Maintained 67 40,015 6,990 3,136 32.1 29.2 73.8 41.0 95.6 49.9 
Controlled 49 27,692 5,562 1,472 23.1 27.3 58.9 33.2 95.8 41.0 
Other 21 12,654 2,192 832 25.8 31.8 66.3 37.3 94.7 43.5 
Western 
Board 
40 25,642 4,133 2,526 24.1 23.5 80.8 58.9 98.3 63.8 
Southern 
Board 
47 30,656 5,516 2,961 18.4 14.9 80.2 61.6 98.2 70.0 
Belfast 
Board 
34 29,417 4,625 3,230 22.0 25.6 83.4 63.0 96.2 63.0 
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North-East 
Board 
48 32,019 5,502 2,843 15.0 15.3 77.1 57.3 99.1 65.3 
South-East 
Board 
36 25,226 4,371 2,183 15.8 20.7 72.3 56.2 98.6 64.3 
Financial 
Stress=1 
10 2,758 593 143 40.0 41.3 57.5 25.7 90.0 47.9 
Financial 
Stress=2 
8 3,140 804 174 32.8 33.4 63.1 28.8 85.6 35.6 
Financial 
Stress=3 
48 36,153 6,367 3,152 23.2 20.5 76.2 51.6 96.9 59.8 
Financial 
Stress=4 
138 100,103 16,251 10,206 16.5 18.5 81.3 65.3 98.6 67.8 
 
Underlying these aspects of performance inequality in Northern Ireland’s post primary 
schools is access inequality whereby free school meal (FSM) pupils and pupils with special 
educational needs (SEN) are grossly under-represented in grammar schools.  As Table 6.1 shows, of 
the total enrolment pupils in grammar schools in 2012-13, only 7% were FSM pupils and 8% were 
SEN pupils. In contrast, of the total enrolment pupils in secondary schools, 28% were FSM pupils and 
29% were SEN pupils. So, half of the total number of secondary school pupils - compared to only 
15% of grammar school pupils - came from deprived backgrounds (FSM pupils) or had special 
educational needs (SEN).  
 Lastly, there is the high level of segregation in Northern Ireland’s schooling system which 
exists notwithstanding the Northern Ireland Executive promoting Cohesion, Sharing and Integration 
as a strategic policy (Northern Ireland Executive, 2011). As the Department of Education statistics 
(2011/12) show:  
 In the primary sector: 5.4% of Catholics attended controlled primary schools; 1% of 
Protestants attended maintained primary schools; and 5.5% of primary school children 
attended integrated schools.  
 In the secondary school sector: 2.1% of Catholics attended controlled secondary schools; 
0.8% of Protestants attended maintained secondary schools; and 14.4% of secondary pupils 
attended integrated schools.  
 In the grammar school sector: 7.7% of Catholics attended Protestant grammar schools; and 
0.9% of Protestants attended Catholic grammar schools.  
 Overall, 6.9% of primary and post-primary pupils attend integrated schools. 
 Many young people in Northern Ireland never experience cross community education until 
they attend university. The segregated school system has resulted in ethno-religious isolation which 
reinforces ‘intra-sectoral bias, stereotyping and prejudice’ (Hughes, 2010: 829).  The First Minister 
referred to the current education system as ‘a benign form of apartheid which is fundamentally 
damaging to our society’ (Robinson, 2010). The Department of Education’s policy Community 
Relations, Equality and Diversity in Education (CRED, 2011a: 25) also makes clear a commitment to 
shared education through encouraging ‘greater sharing and collaboration across and between all 
educational settings on a cross community basis’.  On the face of it, Catholics are much more willing 
to go to Protestant schools than Protestants are to attend Catholic schools with the largest movement 
of Catholic pupils being into Protestant grammar schools. 
 In this chapter, we analyse each of these issues in turn starting with ‘performance inequality’, 
first between grammar schools and secondary schools and, second, between secondary schools only. 
In conducting this analysis, two methods are used to quantify the nature of such inequalities.  The first 
is that of inequality decomposition whereby overall inequality is expressed as the sum of ‘between 
group’ and ‘within group’ inequality.  This technique is applied to grammar/secondary inequality so 
that inequality in educational performance between the 205 post-primary schools in Northern Ireland 
can be decomposed as the sum of inequality between grammar and secondary schools and within 
grammar and secondary schools. The intellectual foundations for this decomposition lie in Theil 
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(1967), Shorocks (1980), and Cowell and Jenkins (1995) and the details of the decomposition are 
contained in an appendix to this chapter. 
 In analysing inequality in educational performance between secondary schools, we use the 
concept of equity-adjusted performance due to Anand and Sen (1997) which in turn is based on the 
social welfare interpretation of inequality pioneered by Atkinson (1970). The central idea here is that 
of ‘inequality aversion’ through which one would be prepared to sacrifice a greater mean outcome, 
accompanied by higher inequality, for a lower mean income with lower inequality. The size of the 
sacrifice would depend upon how much one disliked inequality (the degree of inequality aversion) 
and would result in what Anand and Sen (1997), in the context of the UNDP’s Human Development 
Indices, refer to as ‘equity-adjusted achievements’. The technical details of the link between welfare 
and inequality are also set out in an appendix to this chapter. 
 Another aspect of inequality analysed in this chapter is as, noted earlier, exemplified by the 
absurdly small proportion of grammar school pupils who are ‘disadvantaged’, either in terms of 
parental income (FSM pupils) or in terms educational needs (SEN pupils).  We refer to this inequality 
as ‘access inequality’ and first present a measure of the difficulty that FSM and SEN pupils have in 
accessing grammar schools and, following that, suggest policies for addressing this problem.    
 After the analysis of inequality in post-primary education, outlined above, the chapter 
addresses the issue of religious segregation in Northern Ireland’s primary and post-primary schools. 
After analysing the issues surrounding school segregation we propose a means of overcoming the 
deleterious consequences of such segregation, without requiring pupils to surrender their religious 
identity, through the medium of ‘shared education’.  We emphasise in this chapter that there is a clear 
and important distinction between integrated education which, 22 years after its inception in 1992, 
has not proved popular with Northern Ireland parents - with less than 9% of post-primary pupils 
attending integrated schools - and shared education which is being accepted more readily. 
 Lastly, this chapter addresses the question of underachievement of FSM post-primary pupils, 
relative their non-FSM counterparts and, in particular, by FSM pupils from a Protestant background.    
6.2. Differences in Educational Outcomes between Grammar and Secondary Schools 
 In discussing differences in educational performance between grammar schools and 
secondary schools we focus on the proportion of Year 12 pupils obtaining 5+A*-C (E&M) GCSE 
passes and on the proportion of Year 14 pupils obtaining 3+A*-C A-level passes because it is with 
respect to these two indicators that the difference between the two sectors is most marked. As Table 
6.1 shows, the proportion of  5+A*-C (E&M) GCSE passes was , respectively,  94% and 38% for 
grammar and secondary schools and the proportion of  3+A*-C A-level passes was , respectively,  
77% and 47% for grammar and secondary schools.   
Given the division of schools by two groups, grammar and secondary, there are two sources 
of inequality: between-group and within-group.  The method of inequality decomposition attempts to 
separate (or decompose) overall inequality into its constituent parts: between-group and within-group.  
When the decomposition is additive, overall inequality can be written as the sum of within group and 
between group inequality.   
 
  
overall ineqality within group inequality between group inequality
I A B= +   
The between group inequality arises because the mean performance of grammar schools is 
different from the mean performance of secondary schools.  As noted earlier, the average proportion 
of  5+A*-C (E&M) GCSE passes was , respectively,  94% and 38% for grammar and secondary 
schools and the proportion of  3+A*-C A-level passes was , respectively,  77% and 47% for grammar 
and secondary schools.  It is these differences in average values between the groups that lead to the 
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term B, above.  But there are also differences in performance between schools within the secondary 
and the grammar sectors.  It is these within-group differences that lead to the term A, above.  
Only inequality indices which belong to the family of Generalised Entropy Indices are 
additively decomposable (Shorrocks, 1980).  These indices are defined by a parameter θ and when 
θ=0 the inequality index is Theil’s (1967) Mean Logarithmic Deviation (MLD) Index: 
 
1
( ; ) log( / ) /
N
i
i
I N p p N
=
 
=  
 
∑p   (6.1) 
where: N is the number of schools, pi is the ‘performance’ of school i (i=1…N); p  is the mean 
performance over the N schools; and p={pi} is the vector of performances.     
When inequality is additively decomposed then one can say that the basis on which the 
schools were subdivided (in this case, grammar/secondary) contributed [(B/I)×100]% to overall 
inequality, the remaining inequality, [(A/I)×100]%, being due to inequality within the groups.  If, 
indeed, inequality can be ‘additively decomposed’ along the above schema, then, as Cowell and 
Jenkins (1995) have shown, the proportionate contribution of the between-group component (B) to 
overall inequality is the income inequality literature’s analogue of the R2 statistic used in regression 
analysis: the size of this contribution is a measure of the amount of inequality that can be ‘explained’ 
by the factor (or factors) used to subdivide the sample (gender; maternal literacy status etc.).   
Inequality decomposition provides a way of analysing the extent to which inter-group inequality can 
be ‘explained’ by a factor of division. The basic question that this section seeks to answer is how 
much of the overall inequality between Northern Ireland’s post-primary schools, in their GCSE and 
A-level performances can be explained by the grammar/secondary binary divide? 
 Inter-school inequality in 5+A*-C (E&M) GCSE passes, as measured by the MLD index of 
equation (6.1), was 0.148.  Of this total equality, inequality between grammar and secondary schools 
contributed 0.103 (70%) and inequality within the two sectors contributed 0.045 (30%).  Similarly, 
inter-school inequality in 3+A*-C A-level passes, as measured by the MLD index of equation (6.1), 
was 0.061.  Of this total equality, inequality between grammar and secondary schools contributed 
0.029 (48%) and inequality within the two sectors contributed 0.032 (52%).  These contributions are 
illustrated in Figure 6.1. 
 The most significant feature of these results is the large proportion of post-primary 
educational inequality in Northern Ireland – two-thirds in the case of inter-school differences in 
proportions obtaining 5+A*-C (E&M) GCSE passes, and nearly half in the case of inter-school 
differences in proportions obtaining 3+A*-C A-level passes - that can be explained by a single factor: 
the grammar/secondary divide.  To put this result into perspective, Cowell and Jenkins (1995) found 
that three factors taken collectively – age, sex, and race of the family head – could not explain more 
than 20%-25% of income inequality in the United States.  In this context, to explain 48%-70% of 
educational inequality by a single factor is, indeed, a remarkable achievement!  
 
  
5 
 
Figure 6.1 Contributions to Inequality in Educational Performance, Grammar/Secondary    
  
70% 
30% 
Between Within
5+A*-C (E&M) GCSE Passes  
48% 
52% 
Between Within
3+A*-C A-level Passes 
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6.3. Differences in Educational Outcomes between Secondary Schools 
 There was very little difference between grammar schools in their examination performance 
in 2013, either in their proportions obtaining 5+A*-C (E&M) GCSE passes or in their proportions 
obtaining 3+A*-C A-level passes.  Grammar schools in the lowest and highest deciles of achievement 
had mean success rates of 99% and 88% with respect to 5+A*-C (E&M) GCSE passes and mean 
success rates of 89% and 64% with respect to 3+A*-C A-level passes.  The picture with respect to 
secondary schools was very different. Secondary schools in the lowest and highest deciles of 
achievement had mean success rates of 58% and 21% with respect to 5+A*-C (E&M) GCSE passes 
and mean success rates of 65% and 26% with respect to 3+A*-C A-level passes. 
A popular measure of inequality, with respect to a specific achievement, is the Kuznets (1955) 
ratio. This is the ratio of achievements of the highest and lowest deciles. For example, in its most 
usual application to measuring income inequality, the Kuznets ratio is the ratio of the mean incomes 
of the richest 10% and the poorest 10% of earners.   Applying this concept to inequality in educational 
performance,  the Kuznets ratio for grammar schools was, on the basis of the above figures, 1.1 with 
respect to 5+A*-C (E&M) GCSE passes and 1.4 with respect to 3+A*-C A-level passes; the Kuznets 
ratio for secondary schools was much greater: 2.8 with respect to 5+A*-C (E&M) GCSE passes and 
2.5 with respect to 3+A*-C A-level passes. 
Yet another popular measure of inequality is the Gini coefficient.  Applied to schools, and 
using the notation under equation (6.1), the Gini coefficient associated with his scores is defined as: 
 2
1 1
1 | |
2
N N
i j
i j
G p p
N p = =
= −∑∑   (6.2) 
In other words, the Gini coefficient is computed as half the mean of the difference in 
proportions obtaining 5+A*-C (E&M) GCSE passes (or 3+A*-C A-level passes) between pairs of 
schools, divided by the average score ( p  ).  So, G=0.10 implies that the average difference in 
proportions, between two schools chosen at random, will be 20% of the average score: if p =50%, 
this difference will be 10 percentage points (pp).   
The value of the Gini coefficient for grammar schools, in respect of their proportions (of 
relevant pupils) with 5+A*-C (E&M) GCSE passes and 3+A*-C A-level passes, were, respectively, 
0.035 and 0.078.  Taken in conjunction with the mean proportions of  94% and 77% (Table 6.1), these 
results imply that two grammar schools chosen at random would differ in their proportions of Year 12 
pupils 5+A*-C (E&M) GCSE passes by 7% of 94% (that is, by 6.6pp) and would differ in their 
proportion of Year 14pupils 3+A*-C A-level passes by 15.6% of 77%  and (that is, by 12pp).  
  In contrast, the value of the Gini coefficient for secondary schools, in respect of their 
proportions (of relevant pupils) with 5+A*-C (E&M) GCSE passes and 3+A*-C A-level passes, were, 
respectively, 0.217 and 0.201.  Taken in conjunction with the mean proportions of 38% and 47% 
(Table 6.1), these results imply that two secondary schools chosen at random would differ in their 
proportions of Year 12 pupils 5+A*-C (E&M) GCSE passes by 43% of 38% (that is, by 16pp) and 
would differ in their proportion of Year 14pupils 3+A*-C A-level passes by 40% of 77% and (that is, 
by 31pp).  Since, as we have shown, there was very little inequality in educational performance 
between grammar schools, our focus will be on inter-school inequality in educational performance 
between secondary schools.  
The reason for this focus on inequality is that, as Atkinson's (1970) seminal paper showed, 
there is a close relation between social welfare and inequality.  Adapting Atkinson’s (1970) paper to 
inequality in educational performance we can, using the notation used in equation (6.1), define an 
additively separable educational welfare function as: 
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In equation (6.3), U is the utility of school i (i=1…N) where this utility depends positively on the 
proportion of its pupils who achieve a ‘good’ result; W is the level of educational welfare and is 
expressed as the sum of the school utility functions.  
Figure 6.2: A Concave Utility Function and Diminishing Marginal Utility 
p=performance
u(p) = utility of p
u(25%)
u(75%)
25% 80%
An increase in p from 25% to 30% causes utility to increase by more than
an increase in p from 75% to 80%.  Marginal utility diminishes with p
30% 75%
 
The important assumption made with respect to the utility function, U, is that it is concave 
(Figure 6.2) or, equivalently, that it embodies diminishing marginal utility. In other words, the 
increase in utility from a given performance improvement will depend upon the level of performance 
from which it is achieved. In effect this means that a school that raises its performance from 25% to 
30% will experience higher utility than will a school that raises its performance from 75% to 80% 
(that is, by the same amount (5pp) but from a 75% success rate).  The implication of this assumption 
is that educational welfare will be maximised when every school has the same level of performance, 
that is, 1 2 .. Np p p= = = .  The fact that, in practice, schools do not have the same level of performance 
means that educational welfare is sub-optimal. 
The fact that welfare is sub-optimal in the presence of inter-school inequality is the 
consequence of inequality aversion on the part of the policy maker. Inequality aversion implies a 
willingness to sacrifice a higher mean performance in order to obtain a higher degree of equality 
(lower inequality).  This leads very naturally to the concept of equally distributed equivalent (EDE) 
performance:  this is the level of performance which, if equally distributed across the schools, yields 
the same level of educational welfare as the existing performance level and its existing inter-school 
distribution.      
 These ideas are illustrated in Figure 6.4. The line LM shows the various distributions of 
performance (defined as the proportion of the relevant pupils obtaining good GCSE or A-level grades) 
between two schools, 1 and 2, for a given level of overall performance p =OE.  At the point C on LM, 
both schools have the same performance so that: 1 2p p p OE= = = .  If the actual distribution is at 
point A ( 1 2
A Ap p>  ), then the social welfare associated with this is WA.  A lower level of performance, 
OB which is equally distributed between schools 1 and 2 yields the same level of welfare as the 
higher level OE distributed according to A.  Following Atkinson (1970), we term OB (< OE) as the 
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‘equally distributed equivalent’ (EDE) performance: it is the level of performance which, if equally 
distributed, would be welfare-equivalent to a higher performance level, distributed unequally. 
Figure 6.4: The Equally Distributed Equivalent Performance 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The above view of the welfare-reducing effects of inequality raises an important question: by 
how much is welfare reduced through inequality?  Atkinson (1970) showed that the answer to this 
question depended on society’s ‘aversion to inequality’: the same distribution of income would 
generate different welfare levels, depending upon how much society disliked inequality.  If society 
was relaxed about inequality (low inequality aversion), the reduction in welfare would be small; on 
the other hand, if society greatly disliked inequality (high inequality aversion), the reduction in 
welfare, would be large. Atkinson (1970) measured inequality aversion by the value of a (inequality 
aversion) parameter, 0ε ≥ .  When 0ε = , we are not at all averse to inequality implying that we 
would not be prepared to accept even the smallest reduction in average income in order to secure an 
equitable distribution. The degree of inequality aversion increases with the value of ε : the higher the 
value of ε , the more averse we would be to inequality and, in order to secure an equitable distribution 
of income, the greater the reduction in average income we would find acceptable. 
On the basis of these concepts, Anand and Sen (1997), in a paper prepared for the 1995 
Human Development Report, pointed out that a country's non-economic achievements were likely to 
be unequally distributed between subgroups of its population.  For example, in terms of gender 
equality, which was the focus of their concern, the female literacy rate, or female life expectancy, was 
often lower than that for males.  In the face of such inter-group inequality, they argued that a country's 
achievement with respect to a particular outcome should not be judged exclusively by its mean level 
of achievement (for example, by the average literacy rate for a country) but rather by the mean level 
adjusted to take account of inter-group differences in achievements. Anand and Sen (1997) proposed 
a method, based on Atkinson's (1970) paper, for making such adjustments and they termed the 
resulting indicators equity sensitive indicators.  They further suggested that assessments of country 
achievements should be made on the basis of such equity sensitive indicators rather than, as was often 
the case, on the basis of its mean level of achievement.  This would then allow a comparison between 
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two countries, one of which had a lower mean achievement level, but a more equitable distribution of 
achievement, than the other1. 
These ideas can, equally well, be applied to the measurement of educational performance.  
We can reduce the average performance of a schooling system, p , of a country by the amount  of 
inter-group inequality in living standards to arrive at ep , the EDE performance level.  This is the 
"equity sensitive" performance level for the schooling system, ep p≤  and it yields the same level of 
educational welfare (is welfare equivalent to) as the current level of performance with the current 
inter-school distribution.  More formally: 
 
1
( ) ( )
N
e
i
i
W N U p U p
=
= × =∑   (6.4) 
The size of this reduction, ep p− , depends upon our aversion to inequality: the lower our 
aversion to inequality, the smaller will be the difference and, in the extreme case in which there is no 
aversion to inequality ( 0ε = ), there will be no difference between the average, and the equity 
sensitive, performance levels.  
Three special cases, contingent upon the value assumed byε , may be distinguished: 
1. When 0ε =  (no inequality aversion), ep is the arithmetic mean of the school 
performance levels: ep p= . 
2. When 1ε = , ep  is the geometric mean of the school performance levels:
( )
1/N
1
 < 
N
Ne
i
i
p p p
=
 
=  
 
∏ .  
3. When 2ε = , ep  is the harmonic mean of the school performance levels: 
1
1
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The EDE performance levels associated with ε=0 (arithmetic mean), ε=1 (geometric mean), 
and ε=2 (harmonic mean) are shown in Figure 6.5 for the proportion of Year 12 pupils in Northern 
Ireland’s secondary schools obtaining 5+A*-C (E&M) GCSE passes and for the proportion of Year 14 
pupils in Northern Ireland’s secondary schools obtaining 3+A*-C A-level passes.   
                                                     
1 Anand and Sen (1997) compared the Honduras (with an average literacy rate of 75%, distributed between men 
and women as 78%, 73%) with China (with an average literacy rate of 80%, distributed between men and 
women as 92%, 68%) and asked which country should be regarded as having the ‘better’ achievement with 
regard to literacy: China with a higher overall rate or the Honduras with greater gender equality? 
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Figure 6.5: Equally Distributed Equivalent Performance Levels in Secondary Schools, 5+ A*-C 
GCSE and 3+A*-C A-level passes 
Percentage of relevant pupils (Year 12 for GCSE, Year 14 for A-levels) obtaining the grades shown 
6.4. Difficulties of Accessing Grammar Schools by FSM and SEN pupils 
 Given the fact that the performance of grammar schools is so much superior to that of 
secondary schools, a disturbing feature of Northern Ireland’s post-primary schooling system is that 
pupils from deprived backgrounds (FSM pupils) pupils with special educational needs (SEN pupils) 
were grossly under-represented in grammar schools. As Table 6.1 shows, 57% of the total number of 
secondary school pupils, compared to only 15% of grammar school pupils, was FSM or SEN. 
Table 6.2: Distribution of FSM and SEN pupils by type of School (2012/13) 
 Grammar School Secondary Schools Total 
FSM Pupils 4,632 22,501 27,133 
SEN Pupils 4,945 23,224 28,169 
Other Pupils 53,022 34,636 87,658 
Total Pupils 62,599 80,361 142,960 
Table 6.2 explores in greater detail the distribution of the different types of pupils between 
grammar and secondary schools.  In the school year 2012-13, there were a total of 27,133 FSM post-
primary pupils in Northern Ireland of whom only 4,632 (17%) went to grammar schools with the 
remaining 22,501 FSM pupils (83%) in secondary schools.  Similarly, there were a total of 28,169 
SEN post-primary pupils in Northern Ireland of whom only 4,945 (18%) were grammar school pupils 
with the remaining 23,224 SEN pupils (82%) in secondary schools.  By contrast, of the 87,658 post-
primary pupils in Northern Ireland who were neither FSM nor SEN pupils, 53,022 (60%) attended 
grammar schools while the remaining 34,636 pupils (40%) were secondary school pupils.  Given this 
information, one can measure access inequality to grammar schools between FSM, SEN, and non-
FSM/SEN pupils as follows. 
The number is Table 6.2 suggest that an indicator of the difficulty that pupils from different 
groups had in accessing grammar school education was provided by comparing their representation in 
the population of pupils with their representation among grammar school pupils. So, for example, 
GCSE 5+A*-C (E&M) A-Level 3+A*-C
37.5 46.6 
34.9 43.4 
32.2 39.4 
Harmonic Mean
Geometric Mean
Artimetic Mean
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FSM and SEN pupils were disproportionately underrepresented among grammar schools because 
while they, respectively, comprised 19% and 20% of Northern Ireland's post-primary pupils they, 
respectively, accounted for only 7% and 8% of its grammar school pupils.  Similarly, pupils who were 
not deprived (that is, neither FSM nor SEN) were disproportionately overrepresented among grammar 
schools because while they constituted 61% of Northern Ireland's post-primary pupils, they comprised 
85% of its grammar school pupils. Against this background, the relevant question is how to merge 
these disproportions in presence in a universal (all pupils) compared to a specific (grammar school) 
population into a single measure of access inequality.  Ideally such a measure should satisfy the 
"Pigou-Dalton condition" which, applied to the present study, requires that an increase in FSM (or 
SEN) pupil numbers in grammar schools, at the expense of an equal reduction in the number of non-
deprived pupils, would reduce access inequality.2 
 Suppose the three groups are indexed k=1 (FSN), k=2 (SEN), and k=3 (non-deprived) such 
that Nk and Gk are the numbers of pupils from each group in, respectively all schools and in grammar 
schools.  Then 
3 3
1 1
 and   k k
k k
N N G G
= =
= =∑ ∑ are, respectively, the total number of pupils in all schools 
and in grammar schools. 
 One way of measuring inequality in a variable is by the natural logarithm of the ratio of the 
arithmetic mean of the variable to its geometric mean. 3  As Bourguignon (1979) demonstrates, such a 
measure satisfies inter alia the Pigou-Dalton condition (discussed above).  This idea translates very 
naturally, from its usual application to income inequality, to measuring the degree of inequality 
associated with educational (or labour market or health) outcomes in which people in different 
population groups meet with different degrees of success in securing a "desirable outcome".  In this 
study, the three groups are FSM, SEN, and non-deprived pupils and the "desirable outcome" is access 
to a grammar school education.  The variable of interest is the access rate to grammar schools of 
pupils from group k - defined as the proportion of pupils from that group who were grammar school 
pupils - and it is inequality in the distribution of this rate between the three groups that is sought to be 
measured.  This inequality is referred to, hereafter, as “access inequality”. 
 The success rate of group k (denoted ek) is / ,  0 1k k k ke G N e= ≤ ≤ .  Then the arithmetic and 
geometric means of ek are, respectively: 
 
33 3
1 11
ˆ  and ( )   / ,   1knk k k k k k
k kk
e e n e e where n N N n
= ==
= = = =∑ ∑∏  (6.5) 
so that the measure of access inequality is:  
 
1
ˆlog( / ) log( ) log( )
K
k k
k
J e e e n e
=
= = −∑  (6.6) 
Now from the definition of ek: 
( )( )( ) ( )/ / / /  ( / )( / )( / ) /k k k k k k k k ke G N G N N G G N G G N N G N g n e= = = =  (6.7)
where :  /  and /k k k kg G G n N N= = are, respectively, group k's share of grammar school pupils and 
of all pupils.  Employing equation (6.7) in equation (6.6): 
                                                     
2 In the language of inequality analysis this transfer from an "access-rich" group to an "access-poor" group 
constitutes a progressive transfer and, by virtue of this, is inequality reducing.  
3 See Bourguignon (1979) , Theil (1967), and Borooah (2001). 
12 
 
 
3 3 3
1 1 1
ˆlog( / ) log( ) log( ) log( ) log logk kk k k k
k k kk k
g nJ e e e n e e n e n
n g= = =
   
= = − = − =   
   
∑ ∑ ∑  (6.8) 
 From equation (6.8), inequality is minimised when J=0.  This occurs when k kn g= , that is 
when each group's share in the total of all pupils (nk) is equal to its share in the total of grammar 
school pupils (gk). Otherwise,  J>0. 
 From the data shown in Table 6.2, the values of gk for FSM, SEN and non-deprived pupils 
are, respectively: 0.074, 0.079, and 0.847.  The values of nk for FSM, SEN and non-deprived pupils 
are, respectively: 0.19, 0.197, and 0.613. This implies that, from equation (6.8), and multiplying by 
100, J=16.1. 
 To put this result in perspective, Borooah (2001) computed the values for employment 
inequality in Northern Ireland (the J value of equation (6.8)) in the days when the Catholic share in 
employment fell well short of the community's share of the labour force. This shortfall, in turn, 
generated debate about labour market discrimination and spawned the Equal Opportunities 
Legislation that has utterly transformed Northern Ireland's labour market. These results, which are 
reproduced below in Table 6.3, show that, even in those dark days of prejudice and discrimination, the 
disadvantage faced by Catholic job-seekers was considerably less than the difficulties encountered by 
post-primary pupils from deprived backgrounds in entering the portals of Northern Ireland's grammar 
schools. 
Table 6.3: Shares (%) in Employment and the Labour Force 
Catholics and Protestants (Men) 
 Employment 
share 
Labour Force 
Share 
J value 
Year C P C P  
1990 38 62 41 59 5.35 
1991 38 62 42 58 6.82 
1992 34 66 38 62 6.89 
1993 38 62 41 59 4.07 
1994 37 63 40 60 5.64 
                                    C=Catholic; P=Protestant 
                                             Source: Borooah (2001) 
The inequality measure, J, of equation 6, has along the lines suggested by Bourguignon 
(1979), an appealing interpretation.  If social welfare is the sum of identical and concave group utility 
functions whose arguments are ek then social welfare is maximised when ek - the success rate of a 
group - is the same for every group.  If the utility functions are of the logarithmic form (that is 
( ) log( )k kU e e= ) , then J represents the distance between maximum level of social welfare ( log( )e ) 
and the actual level of social welfare (
3
1
log( )k k
k
n e
=
∑ ): social welfare is maximised when access 
inequality is minimised! 
Selection Tests: FSM pupils and Grammar School Admission 
 Access inequality arises because of the use of selection tests for admission to grammar 
schools, conducted at the age of 11 by means of, the popularly termed, ‘11+’ examination. Those who 
would defend the pupil composition of grammar schools, in terms of their FSM/non-FSM proportions, 
would argue that grammar school admission should depend solely upon results in the 11+ 
examination: the test is an arbiter of pupil ability and those who pass this test are ipso facto best 
equipped to benefit from the well-resourced grammar school system and, therefore, are most 
deserving of entry into such schools.  In this section we question the assumption that the test is always 
13 
 
a good arbiter of pupil quality and examine the conditions under which it might fall short in this 
regard.  
Strictly speaking, selection tests are primarily a measure of the ability of candidates to score 
on the particular test they are taking.  There may be correlation (large or small) between candidates’   
test scores and some latent quality (which, by definition, is unobservable) they possess which is the 
object of interest.  We measure the efficacy of a test in terms of this association between the test 
outcome and this latent quality. The use of selection tests for grammar school admission is just a 
particular example of situations in which the outcome of a test - positive or negative - is used to 
determine whether or not a condition (a prospective pupil is worthy of grammar school admission) 
exists.  As such, it is susceptible to a fallacy that is inherent in such situations: confusing the chance 
that a candidate would pass the test if he/she is a ‘good’ pupil with the chance that a candidate is a 
‘good’ pupil if he/she passed the test. In legal situations this is referred to as the Prosecutors' Fallacy 
(Thompson and Schumann, 1987; Aitken, 1996); in medical situations it is termed the Doctors' 
Fallacy (Zackrisson et. al., 2006, Mlodinow, 2009, pp. 114-116); and in labour market situations as 
the Employment Fallacy (Borooah, 2010).4  A similar fallacy could arise in situations where people 
are denied access to grammar schools on the basis of the outcome of a selection test. This is referred 
to here as the selection fallacy and this section provides quantitative estimates of the size of this 
fallacy. 
We assume that there is some innate intellectual quality (IIQ) in a pupil (for, ease of 
reference, a pupil is ‘good’ or ‘not good’) on the basis of which (and only on that basis) it will be 
decided whether he/she is admitted to a grammar school. Since we cannot observe this innate quality, 
we use a proxy observation  based on the results of a selection test such that a candidate gains 
grammar school entry if, and only if, he/she ‘passes’ the test.  Now suppose that 1, 000 candidates sit 
the set and the prior belief is that, of these, 280 (28%) are ‘good’ candidates.  Traditionally, only the 
top 28% of candidates in the (erstwhile) 11+ exam obtained grammar school entry. The nature of the 
test is such that a ‘good’ pupil will have a 95% chance of passing the test (and, therefore, a 5% chance 
of failing the test) and a ‘not good’ pupil will have an 85% chance of failing the test (and, therefore, a 
15% chance of passing the test).  In statistical parlance, the probability of a ‘true positive’ (95%) is 
referred to as the sensitivity of the test and the probability a ‘false negative’ (85%) is referred to as the 
specificity of the test.5    
On the basis of prior belief, there are 280 ‘good’ pupils among the candidates, of whom 266 
will pass the test and 14 will fail the test. Similarly, the prior belief is there are 720 ‘not good’ pupils 
among the candidates of whom 612 will fail the test and 108 will pass the test. So, in total, 374 pupils 
will pass the test, and of these, 266 pupils (71%) will be ‘good’ pupils and 108 (29%) will be ‘not 
good’ pupils. So, 71% of grammar school pupils (all of whom got in by virtue of having passed the 
selection test) will be ‘good’ pupils, deserving of grammar school entry, but 29% of grammar school 
pupils will not be ‘good’ pupils and, therefore, undeserving of entry.  
This result arises for two reasons. First, there is the prior belief that, given the rigorous nature 
of grammar school education, only a limited proportion of candidates (28%, on our assumption) have 
                                                     
4 A prosecutor argues that since the probability of observing a particular piece of evidence (say, blood type 
identical to that found at the scene of the crime), under the assumed innocence of the defendant, is very small 
the probability of the defendant being innocent, given that his blood type matches that at the crime scene, must 
also be very small.  A doctor argues that since the probability of a person testing HIV positive, if he/she was 
HIV free, is very small, the probability of a patient being HIV free, given that he/she tested HIV positive, must 
also be very small.  A labour market analyst argues that because only a small proportion of persons in regular 
employment are from a particular group, the probability of a person from that group being in regular 
employment must also be small. 
5 So, the probability of a ‘true negative’ (5%, in the example) is 1-sensitivity, and the probability of a ‘false 
positive’ (15%, in the example) is 1-specificity.  
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the IIQ to benefit from it. The second reason is that the probability of a ‘false positive’ – meaning a 
‘not good’ student passes the test - is pitched at 15%.  Why should we expect the probability of a 
‘false positive’ to be so high? As stated earlier, at its most basic, a selection test measures the ability 
of a candidate to pass the test.  With suitable parental encouragement, coaching, and burning of 
midnight oil, it is not unreasonable to assume that 15% of ‘not good’ pupils can be taught (can teach 
themselves) to pass the test and thus generate ‘false positives’.  
    Now suppose that pupils are of two types, FSM and non-FSM, and that of the 1,000 
candidates, 200 are FSM and 800 are non-FSM.  The prior belief is that there is no difference in IIQ 
between the two groups so that the prior expectation is that 56 FSM candidates and 244 non-FSM 
candidates (28% of their respective totals) have the IIQ needed to cope with, and benefit from, 
grammar school education.  We assume that the sensitivity of the test remains the same so that there is 
a 95% chance that a ‘good’ candidate, regardless of group, will pass the test.  However, because non-
FSM candidates have the advantage of greater parental resources, and possess greater awareness of 
the importance of going to grammar school, the chances of ‘not good’ candidates passing the test (the 
likelihood of a ‘false positive’) will be higher for non-FSM candidates than for FSM candidates.  
Suppose that the probability of a false positive is 5% for FSM, and 20% for non-FSM, candidates.  
Then we can make the following calculations. 
1. Of the 800 non-FSM candidates, the prior belief is that 224 are ‘good’ and 576 are ‘not 
good’.  Of the 224 ‘good’, and the 576 ‘not good’, non-FSM candidates, respectively, 213 
(95% of 224) and 115 (20% of 576) candidates will pass the test.  This means that of the 328 
non-FSM candidates who pass the test, 65% will be ‘good’ candidates and 35% will not be 
‘good’ candidates. 
2.  Of the 200 FSM candidates, the prior belief is that 56 are ‘good’ and 144 are ‘not good’.  Of 
the 56 ‘good’, and the 144 ‘not good’, FSM candidates, respectively, 53(95% of 56) and 7 
(5% of 144) candidates will pass the test.  This means that of the 60 FSM candidates who 
pass the test, 88% will be ‘good’ candidates and 12% will not be ‘good’ candidates. 
Because of differences between non-FSM and FSM candidates, in resources and in awareness of 
the importance of education, there will be a greater proportion of non-FSM, compared to FSM, 
grammar school pupils ‘who do not deserve to be there’.   On the basis of our assumptions, this 
‘undeserving pupils’ gap’ is 9pp.  Entirely as a consequence of differences in the probability of false 
positives between the two groups, the proportion of FSM and non-FSM pupils in the grammar 
schools’ intake , respectively, 15% (60/388 pupils) and 85% (328/388 pupils) does not reflect their 
respective shares of 20% and 80% in the candidate population.   
If, say, grammar schools invested in FSM pupils by offering coaching to FSM pupils and, 
thereby, raised the probability of a false positives for FSM pupils from 5% to 15%, then of the 144 
‘not good’ FSM candidates, 22 will pass the test. This will raise the proportion of FSM pupils in 
grammar schools from 15% (60/388) to 19% (78/403) and access inequality will be all but eliminated.    
The foregoing analysis can be formalised in a Bayesian framework. Bayes’ Theorem (named 
after the Reverend Thomas Bayes, an18th century Presbyterian minister) says that the probability of a 
theory being true (event T, i.e. a candidate for the test is a ‘good’ pupil), given that the data has been 
observed (passed the selection test [event A]) is:  
 ( | )( | ) ( )
( )
P A TP T A P T
P A
= ×  (6.9) 
where: ( )P T represents the prior belief that the theory is true and ( | ) / ( )P A T P A  is the Bayesian 
“updating factor” which translates one’s prior belief about the theory’s validity into a posterior 
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belief.6  The probability of observing a positive outcome on the selection test is the sum of the 
probabilities of a ‘true positive’ (the candidate passed the selection test and was a ‘good’ pupil) and a 
‘false positive’ (the candidate passed the test and was not a ‘good’ pupil): 
 
prob of false positiveprob of true positive
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( | ) ( ) ( | )P A P A T P A T P T P A T P T P A T= ∩ + ∩ = × + ×
(+(
(+(
    (6.10) 
where: T is the event that the pupil was not a ‘good’ pupil.  Substituting the expression in (6.10) into 
equation (6.11) yields: 
 ( ) ( | )( | )
( ) ( | ) ( ) ( | )
P T P A TP T A
P T P A T P T P A T
×
=
× + × 
 (6.11) 
We assume, as earlier, that 95 out of 100 pupils who are ‘good’ will pass the test (their marks on the 
test will be deemed to be above the limit for grammar school entry) and that 85 out of 100 pupils who 
are ‘not good’ will fail the test (their marks on the test will be deemed to be below the limit for 
grammar school entry): ( | ) 0.95 and ( | ) 0.85P A T P A T= =  , where A is the event that a pupil fails the 
test. The implication of this is that 5% of ‘not good’ candidates will pass the test and that 15% of 
‘good’ candidates will fail the test.  Our assumption is that, prior to the selection test being 
administered, there is a 28% chance that the candidate tested is a ‘good’ pupil, that is, P(T)=0.28.  
Substituting these assumed values into equation (6.11) yields: 
 0.28 0.95( | ) 0.71
0.28 0.95 0.72 0.15
P T A ×= =
× + ×
  (6.12) 
or, in other words, there is a 71% chance that a candidate passing the test will be a ‘good’ pupil 
worthy of grammar school entry.  This suggests that the selection fallacy, which arose from confusing
( | )[ 0.95] with ( | )[ 0.71]P A T P T A= = , is not negligible. 
 Of course this conclusion depends critically on the assumed parameter values: 
( ) 0.28, ( | ) 0.95,  and ( | ) 0.15P T P A T P A T= = = .  The latter two parameter values make, respectively, 
reference to the two facets of reliability embodied in the test:  
1. ( | )P A T  refers to the likelihood of a pupil is ‘good’ being correctly identified.  
2. ( | )P A T  refers to the likelihood of a person who is ‘not good’ being incorrectly identified.   
 In statistical parlance, P(A|T) is the sensitivity of the test and ( | )P A T  is 1- specificity of the 
test.  As equation (6.12) shows, there are three factors that affect the probability that passing the test 
identifies a ‘good’ pupil. They are: (i) the likelihood of a ‘not good’ pupil passing the test: ( | )P A T
(ii) the likelihood of a ‘good’ pupil passing the test: P(A|T) and (iii), the a priori probability that a 
candidate appearing in the test is, in fact, a ‘good’ pupil:  P(T).  
 Now consider two extreme cases.  First, suppose that DENI tossed a coin to determine 
whether or not a pupil should go to grammar school. This is equivalent to assuming that
( | ) ( | ) 0.5P A T P A T= = .  Second, suppose that that a faulty test recorded everyone tested as having 
                                                     
6 The updating factor is the ratio of the probability of observing the data when the theory is true, to that of 
observing the data regardless of whether the theory is true or false: ( ) ( | ) ( ) ( | ) ( )P A P A T P T P A T P T= + , T  
being the event that the theory is false. 
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passed the test: ( | ) ( | ) 1P A T P A T= = . Under both scenarios, ( | ) 0.7P T A = : there is a 70% chance 
that a pupil admitted to a grammar school, on either of these methods, would be a ‘good’ pupil – not 
much different from the 71% chance that a candidate who passed the properly conducted selection test 
would be worthy of grammar school entry!  
6.4 Segregation in Northern Ireland’s schools 
Although, as shown below, Northern Ireland has a highly segregated schooling system, based 
on schools of a particular religious denomination largely attracting pupils from that religion, there has 
been no detailed analysis of segregation of pupils by religion and type of school.  In presenting, 
possibly, the first full analysis of this issue, we use the most recent set of data available for school 
segregation in Northern Ireland which is for the school year 2011-12.   For that reason the numbers 
quoted here differ slightly from the analysis of the earlier sections which was based on 2012-13 
figures.  
The discussion of school segregation proceeds entirely in terms of the binary divide between 
Protestant and Catholic pupils even though of Northern Ireland’s 146,747 post primary pupils in 
2011-12: 75,977 (52%) were Catholic;  56,621 (38%) were Protestant, and  14,149 (10%) were of 
“other religions”.7  The existence of this third group of “other pupils” is almost always ignored in 
discussions of schooling segregation.  So, while it is well known that 89% of Catholic pupils in 
Northern Ireland attended “Catholic “schools (secondary or grammar) and 89% of Protestant pupils 
attended “Protestant “schools (Secondary or Grammar), it is not so well known that 81% of “other” 
pupils attended “Protestant” schools and only 5% attended “Catholic” schools (Secondary or 
Grammar), with 14% in Integrated schools (Grant-maintained and Controlled Integrated).   
The mirror image of this finding was that several Catholic schools were homogenous in terms 
of their pupils’ religion: 93 out of 101 Catholic schools had fewer than 5% of pupils who were non-
Catholic while only five Protestant schools had fewer than 5% of pupils who were non-Protestant.  
From this analysis, it would appear that while Catholic schools in Northern Ireland catered almost 
exclusively to Catholic pupils – in aggregate, of the 68,801 pupils in Catholic schools, 67,542 (98%) 
were Catholic – Protestant schools in Northern Ireland catered for both Protestant pupils and pupils 
from “other” religious backgrounds: in aggregate, of the 65,815 pupils in Protestant schools, 50,288 
(76%) were Protestant and 11,489 (17%) were from other religions, with the remainder of 4,038 
pupils (7%) being Catholic.  Table 6.1, below, compares pupil numbers in Northern Ireland’s post 
primary schools, by management of school (Catholic/Protestant/Integrated) and by the type of school 
(Grammar/Secondary) alongside the religion of the pupils, for two years: 1997-98 and, 15 years later, 
2011-12. 
 
  
                                                     
7 Other Christian, non-Christian, religion unknown or unstated. 
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Table 6.4: Segregation in Northern Ireland’s Post Primary Schooling: 1997/98 and 2011/12 
 Protestant Pupils Catholic Pupils Other Pupils Total Pupils 
 1997-98 2011-12 1977-98 2011-12 1997-98 2011-12 1997-
98 
2011-
12 
Protestant 
Grammar 
Schools 
25,877 25,262 2,495 3,423 6,164 6,772 34,536 35,457 
Protestant 
Secondary 
Schools 
34,795 25,026 1,145 615 4,214 4,717 40,154 30,358 
All 
Protestant 
schools 
60,672 50,288 3,640 4,048 10,378 11,489 74,690 65,815 
Catholic 
Grammar 
Schools 
101 246 27,564 26,548 35 303 27,700 27,097 
Catholic 
Secondary 
Schools 
132 280 46,171 40,994 93 430 46,396 41,704 
All Catholic 
Schools 
233 526 73,735 67,542 128 733 74,096 68,801 
Integrated 
Schools 
1,608 5,807 2,291 4,397 409 1,927 4,308 12,131 
Total 62,513 56,621 79,666 75,977 10,915 14,149 153,094 146,747 
 
The most significant change over this period was the steep fall in pupil numbers in Protestant 
schools (by 8,875 pupils between 1997/98 and 2011/12) and the more moderate fall in pupil numbers 
in Catholic schools (by 5,295 pupils between 1997/98 and 2011/12) accompanied by a sharp rise in 
pupil numbers in Integrated schools (by 7,823 pupils between 1997/98 and 2011/12). The result of 
these changes is that total post primary pupil numbers in Northern Ireland fell by 6,347 between 
1997/98 and 2011/12. 
The other interesting feature of the change in post primary education in Northern Ireland in 
the past 15 years is the rise in the number of pupils from “other” religions, from 10,915 pupils in 
1997/98 to 14,149 pupils in 2011/12.  This rise of 3,234 pupils from other religions should be 
contrasted with the fall in the number of Protestant pupils (by 5,892 pupils) and Catholic pupils (3,689 
pupils) between 1997/98 and 2011/12.  
The vast bulk of pupils from other religions (95%) went to Protestant schools in 1997-98 
when the Integrated school movement was in its infancy).  However, 15 years later, when it could be 
argued that Integrated schools were well established, Protestant schools remained the favourite 
destination of pupils from other religions with 81% of such pupils going to Protestant schools in 
2011/12.  The rise in the number of such pupils in the past 15 years has served to erode the religious 
homogeneity of Protestant schools. In 1997/98, 81% of pupils in Protestant schools (60,672 out of 
74,690 pupils) were Protestant; by 2011/12, this proportion had fallen to 76% (50,288 out of 65,815 
pupils) with the slack being taken up by pupils from other religions (whose proportion among 
Protestant school pupils rose from 14% in 1997/98 to 17% in 2011/12). 
The popularity of Protestant schools with pupils from other religions was largely with respect 
to Protestant grammar schools. Of the 11,489 ‘other religion’ pupils who attended Protestant schools, 
59% attended grammar schools.  Similarly, Catholic pupils (whose proportion in the pupil body of 
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Protestant schools rose from 5% in 1997/98 to 6% in 2011/12) were attracted to Protestant grammar 
schools: of the 4,048 Catholic pupils in Protestant schools, 85% were in Protestant grammar schools 
and only 15% were in Protestant secondary. These observations contrast with the fact that of the 
65,815 pupils in Protestant schools, only 54% were in grammar schools.   
The result was that, in 2011/12, only five (out of 95) post primary Protestant schools had 
fewer than 5% of non-Protestant pupils compared to 39 (out of 116) such Protestant schools in 
1997/98.  The religious homogeneity of Catholic schools remained unchanged over this 15 year 
period: only three out of 111 Catholic schools in 1997/98, and eight out of 101 Catholic schools in 
2011/12, had more than 5% of pupils who were non-Catholic.   
Measuring Segregation 
 The forgoing analysis invites the question of whether the degree of religious segregation in 
North Ireland’s schools can be measured in the presence of three religious groups: Catholic, 
Protestant, and ‘other’ religions?  As with measuring access inequality, discussed above, an appealing 
way of viewing segregation is in terms of group disproportionality (Reardon and Firebaugh, 2002). 
So, using this approach, one should compare the proportions of persons, belonging to different groups 
(Catholic, Protestant, Other in the case of segregation; FSM, SEN, non-FSM/SEN in the case 
deprivation/special needs) in the total numbers in a particular organisation (school, housing estate, or 
workplace) with the proportions of persons from these groups in the population at large. The 
“distance” between the organisation-specific proportions and the population proportions then provides 
a measure of segregation.  The analysis of access inequality of the previous section, applied to 
segregation, results in an identical measure of distance (but now denoted by L): 
 
3
1
log kk
k k
nL n
g=
 
=  
 
∑   (6.13) 
Where: nk is the share of pupil group k (Catholic, Protestant, Other) in the pupil population;  gk is the 
share of pupil group k (Catholic, Protestant, Other) in the pupils of a school or type of school; and L is 
the measure of segregation.   
From equation (6.9), segregation is non-existent when L=0.  This occurs when k kn g= , that is 
when each group's share in the total of all post-primary pupils (nk) is equal to its share in the total of 
pupils in a particular type of school;  otherwise,  L>0.  The higher the value of L, the greater the 
degree of segregation or, equivalently, the greater will be the distance from zero segregation. 
Hypothetically, it could be that L is smaller for particular types of school but larger for others.  For 
example, integrated schools, in which, as shown in Table 6.4, 48% of pupils in 2011-12 were 
Protestant, 36% were Catholic, and 16% were of ‘other’ religions, would have a lower L value 
compared to Catholic schools in which, in 2011-12, 0.7% of pupils were Protestant, 98% were 
Catholic, and 1.3% were of ‘other’ religions. 
Figure 6.6 shows the values of L, the segregation index, for seven post-primary school types: 
(i) all Protestant schools; (ii) Protestant grammar schools; (iii) Protestant secondary schools; (iv) all 
Catholic schools; (v) Catholic grammar schools; (vi) Catholic secondary schools; (vii) Integrated 
schools.  This shows that the degree of segregation in Catholic schools, considered in their entirety, 
was nine times that in integrated schools: 254 against 28.  On the other hand, there the degree of 
segregation in Protestant schools was only 30% of that in Catholic schools, considered in their 
entirety (75 versus 254) and only 2.8 times that in Integrated schools.  Within a particular category of 
school, there was a striking difference in segregation between Protestant grammar and secondary 
schools (57 versus 75) but there was little difference in segregation between Catholic grammar and 
secondary schools (245 versus 260).   
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Figure 6.4: Values of the Segregation Index by Type of School 
 
6.5 Underachievement in Post-Primary Education in Northern Ireland 
 According to aggregate data published by DENI (2013), the proportion of Northern Ireland’s 
pupils obtaining 5+A*-C (E&M) GCSE passes was 62%.  However, this aggregate figure masked 
differences in performance by different pupil groups with the average performance of pupils from 
some group lying below the Northern Ireland overall average. We define such groups as 
‘underachieving groups’. Foremost such groups are FSM pupils, only 34.1% of whom obtained 5+A*-
C (E&M) GCSE passes in 2011-12. Compounding this is the religion and the gender divide. If we 
separate FSM pupils by religion and gender, then only 19.7% of Protestant, compared to 33.2% of 
Catholic, FSM boys obtained 5+A*-C (E&M) GCSE passes.  For Protestant and Catholic FSM girls, 
the corresponding figures were, respectively, 43.8% and 32.4%.  The details of the proportions 
obtaining 5+A*-C (E&M) GCSE passes by FSM status, religion, and gender are shown in Figure 6.5. 
This shows that the maximum achievement gap was between FSM, Protestant, boys (only 19.7% of 
whom obtained 5+A*-C (E&M) GCSE passes) and non-FSM, Catholic, girls (76.7% of whom 
obtained 5+A*-C (E&M) GCSE passes: there was a gulf of 57pp in their respective success rates with 
respect to 5+A*-C (E&M) GCSE passes. The details for the different groups, in terms of the 
proportion of their school leavers obtaining 5+A*-C (E&M) GCSE passes, are set out in Figure 6.5.    
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Figure 6.5: Under and Overachievement by Pupil Group in 2011-12: Proportion of School 
Leavers Obtaining 5+A*-C (E&M) GCSE passes 
 
 The question is how much did each of these three factors – FSM status, religion, gender - 
contribute to this gap of 57pp? We can answer this question by isolating the change from each of 
these factors, holding the others constant.  So, ceteris paribus, a change in status from FSM to non-
FSM would raise the GCSE achievement (as defined above) of FSM Protestant boys from 19.7% to 
58.6% (an increase of 38.9pp); a further change of religion would raise the GCSE achievement of 
non-FSM Protestant (58.6%) to that of non-FSM Catholic boys (64.5%): an increase of 5.9pp.  Lastly, 
the gender effect would raise the GCSE achievement of non-FSM Catholic boys (64.5%) to that of 
non-FSM Catholic girls (76.7%): an increase of 12.2pp.  So, of the original gap of 57pp between FSM 
Protestant boys and non-FSM Catholic girls: 68% was due to FSM status, 10% was the effect of 
religion; and 22% was the effect of gender.   
 However, the problem is that the decomposition is not unique and depending on the sequence 
of changes, we would get a slightly different result.  In the above example, the sequence was FSM → 
Religion → Gender. But, equally well, we could have had the sequence Gender → Religion → FSM.  
In general, there are six possible routes to explaining the 57pp gap in achievement rate between FSM 
Protestant boys and non-FSM Catholic girls and these are set out below in Table 6.4:   
 
Table 6.4: Six Routes out of FSM Protestant Male School Leavers’ GCSE Underachievement 
 FSM Religion Gender 
57 = 76.7-19.7 58.6-19.7 64.5-58.6 76.7-64.5 
 FSM Gender Religion 
57=76.7-19.7 58.6-19.7 64.5-58.6 76.7-64.5 
 Gender Religion FSM 
57=76.7-19.7 32.4-19.7 43.8-32.4 76.7-43.8 
 Gender FSM Religion 
57=76.7-19.7 32.4-19.7 71.8-32.4 76.7-71.8 
 Religion Gender FSM 
57=76.7-19.7 33.2-19.7 43.8-33.2 76.7-43.8 
 Religion FSM Gender 
57=76.7-19.7 33.2-19.7 64.5-33.2 76.7-64.5 
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 The contributions made the three factors - FSM, religion, and gender - to explaining the 57pp 
gap in achievement rate between FSM Protestant male, and non-FSM Catholic female, school leavers 
were then computed as the average of the contributions made by each of these three factors under the 
six routes shown in Table 6.4.  These percentage contributions (illustrated in Figure 6.6) were: 63% 
FSM; 19% gender; and 18% religion.  On our calculations, these then are the relative strengths of the 
factors contributing to the educational underachievement of Protestant boys from deprived 
backgrounds,   
Figure 6.6: Percentage Contributions of FSM status, Religion, and Gender to FSM Protestant 
Male Underachievement in terms of 5+ A*-C GCSE Passes 
 
 It is also possible to view educational underachievent (and its mirror image,  
‘overachievement’) in Northern Ireland in terms of disproprtionality. The disprportionality arises 
because the shares of each the 12 groups – obtained by combining the categories FSM/non-FSM, 
male/female, Catholic/Protestant/Other – in the population of school leavers are different from their 
shares in the population of those who obtained 5+A*-C (E&M) GCSE passes. 8  For example, in 2011-
12, the 4,402 non-FSM, Catholic, female school leavers comprised 19.5% of the total of 22,568 
school leavers but the 3,377 non-FSM, Catholic, female school leavers who obtained 5+A*-C (E&M) 
GCSE passes comprised 24% of the total of 13,990 school leavers who obtained this qualification.  At 
the other extreme, the 590 FSM, Protestant, male school leavers comprised 2.6 % of the total of 
22,568 school leavers but the 116 FSM, Protestant, male school leavers who obtained 5+A*-C (E&M) 
GCSE passes comprised 0.8% of the total of 13,990 school leavers who obtained this qualification.  
  This idea of disproportionality – which was previously employed in this chapter to measure 
‘access inequality’ to grammar schools in Norhern Ireland and the degree of segregation in Nothern 
Ireland’s post-primary schools  - can also be used to measure educational underachievement / 
overachievement .  To do so we define a ‘achievement disproportionality’ measure, K as:  
                                                     
8 The 12 groups are: 1. FSM Protestant boys; 2. FSM Protestant girls; 3. FSM Catholic boys; 4. FSM Catholic 
girls; 5. FSM Other religion girls 6. FSM Other religion boys 7. non-FSM Protestant boys; 8. non-FSM 
Protestant girls; 9. non-FSM Catholic boys; 10. non-FSM Catholic girls 11. non-FSM Other religion boys; 12. 
non-FSM Other religion girls ;  
63% 
18% 
19% 
The overall gap between FSM Protestant male, and non-FSM Catholic 
female, school leavers in proportions obtaining 5+ A*-C GCSE Passes 
was 57 percentage points in 2011-12 
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Where: nk is the share of pupil group k (k=1…12) in the school leavers’ population;  gk is the share of 
pupil group k (k=1…12) in the population of school leavers who obtained 5+A*-C (E&M) GCSE 
passes; and K is the measure of ‘achievement disproportionality’.  The value of K, which was 
computed as 3.8, showed that, overall, disproportionality was not a glaring issue in Northern Ireland’s 
GCSE achievements. Indeed, there was less disproportionality in GCSE outcomes than there was, as 
Table 6.3 shows, in employment outcomes in Northern Ireland in the 1990s and, indeed, as shown 
earlier, in FSM pupil access to grammar schools.9    
What is a serious issue is the low level of achievement of specific groups. Most narrowly, 
there is the fact that less than one in five FSM Protestant boys, and less than one in three FSM 
Protestant girls, left school with 5+A*-C (E&M) GCSE passes. The position for Catholic FSM boys 
and girls was better: one in three FSM Catholic boys, and over four out of 10 FSM Catholic girls, left 
school with 5+A*-C (E&M) GCSE passes. In the previous chapter we saw that, compared to 
Protestant schools, Catholic schools produced better examination results over the aggregate of their 
school leavers.  These results show that Catholic schools also produced better examination results for 
their FSM school leavers: Catholic FSM male and female school leavers outperformed their 
Protestant counterparts by more than 10pp.  So, the question that those responsible for education 
policy in Northern Ireland must ask is this: what is wrong with Protestant schools and what can they 
learn from their Catholic neighbours? 
6.6 Using PISA data to identify deprived pupils in Northern Ireland 
The Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) is a survey of the educational 
achievement of 15-year-olds organised by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD).  A total of 65 countries participated in PISA 2009, the fourth survey. This 
included 33 OECD member countries and 24 members of the European Union (EU).  PISA reports the 
socio-economic background of pupils by means of an Economic, Social and Cultural Status (ESCS) 
index. This is based on pupils’ responses to questions about their parents’ background and education 
and possessions in their homes such a higher value of the index implies a ‘better’ background. The 
index is set to a mean of zero across the OECD countries, with a standard deviation of 1.  According 
to Figure 6.7, which shows the mean ESCS index value × 100 for the four countries of the UK 
(Northern Ireland, Scotland, England, and Wales) and Ireland, the value of this index was highest in 
England (index value =22.8), next highest in Scotland (18.4), followed by Northern Ireland and Wales 
(13.2), with Ireland (5.8) bringing up the rear. 
   
 
  
                                                     
9 Yet another facet of the disproportionality issue is the fact that, in 2011-12, FSM pupils comprised 17.5% of 
school leavers, but only 9.6% of school leavers obtaining 5+A*-C (E&M) GCSE passes.  The K value for this 
was 2.9. 
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Figure 6.7: Average ESCS Index Scores for the United Kingdom countries and Ireland 
 
The values for the ESCS index for Northern Ireland were organised into quintiles such that 
the 20% of pupils whose ESCS value placed them in the bottom quintile were identified as ‘deprived’ 
(corresponding to the FSM pupils who comprised 20% of Northern Ireland’s post-primary pupil 
population) with the remaining pupils (in quintiles 2-5) regarded as ‘not deprived’.  According to 
Figure 6.8, which shows the composition of deprived pupils in terms of their family structure and 
their parents’ economic class, 42% of deprived pupils in Northern Ireland  (as compared to 28% of all 
pupils)  had parents who were white collar and low skilled, 28% of deprived pupils (as compared to 
7% of all pupils) had parents who were blue collar and high skilled, and 23% of deprived pupils (as 
compared to 6% of all pupils) had parents who were blue collar and low skilled.  At the other end of 
the scale, 7% of deprived pupils (as compared to 60% of all pupils) had parents who were white collar 
and high skilled.  In terms of family structure, 33% of deprived pupils (as compared to 22% of all 
pupils) lived with just one parent and 66% of deprived pupils (as compared to 77% of all pupils) lived 
with two parents. 
Figure 6.8: The Economic Class and Family Structure of Deprived Pupils in Northern Ireland 
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The values of the ESCS index also correlate well with factors which might be expected to 
influence academic success.  PISA constructs a ‘home educational resource’ (HER) index for the 
pupils that it surveys (such that a low HER value signifies poor resources). Organising the surveyed 
pupils according by quintiles of the HER index values, we found that 64% of deprived pupils in 
Northern Ireland, as compared to 27% of non-deprived pupils, were in the lowest HER quintile. 
Another index constructed by PISA is the ‘attitude to school’ (ATS) index (such that a low ATS value 
signifies a poor attitude). Organising the surveyed pupils according by quintiles of the ATS index 
values, we found that 44% of deprived pupils in Northern, as compared to 34% of non-deprived 
pupils, were in the lowest ATS quintile.  The point can be rounded off by referring to another PISA 
index relating to the ‘joy of reading’ (JRD) index (such that a low JRD value signifies a lack of joy in 
reading). Organising the surveyed pupils according by quintiles of the JRD index values, we found 
that 34% of deprived pupils in Northern, as compared to 23% of non-deprived pupils, were in the 
lowest JRD quintile. 
Using data from PISA 2009 on pupils and schools it was possible to examine the factors 
which determined pupil scores in reading and mathematics and the estimates from a multivariate 
regression equation are shown in Table 6.5.  There were 1,817 observations on the ‘reading’ and the 
‘mathematics’ equations, with adjusted R2 values of, respectively, of 0.313 and 0.349. 
 
Table 6.5: Factors Determining PISA Reading and Mathematics Test Scores 
 Reading Mathematics 
 Coeff SE t value P value Coeff SE t value P value 
Female 26.6 3.5 7.5 0.0 -18.8 3.1 -6.0 0.0 
Grade 11.7 4.7 2.5 0.0 19.5 4.2 4.7 0.0 
White collar, high skilled 53.0 8.6 6.1 0.0 54.9 7.6 7.2 0.0 
White collar, low skilled 23.4 8.4 2.8 0.0 26.0 7.4 3.5 0.0 
Blue collar, high skilled 16.4 9.4 1.7 0.1 24.0 8.3 2.9 0.0 
Single Parent Family -9.5 4.8 -2.0 0.0 -9.2 4.2 -2.2 0.0 
Controlled School -4.4 3.9 -1.1 0.3 -7.4 3.5 -2.2 0.0 
Home Possessions Q4 20.6 4.6 4.5 0.0 22.0 4.0 5.5 0.0 
Home Possessions Q3 5.9 4.5 1.3 0.2 10.8 4.0 2.7 0.0 
Attitude to School Q4 14.9 5.3 2.8 0.0 10.2 4.7 2.2 0.0 
Attitude to School Q3 14.1 4.2 3.3 0.0 10.4 3.8 2.8 0.0 
Attitude to School Q2 5.1 5.3 1.0 0.3 4.5 4.7 1.0 0.3 
Student Behaviour in School Q4 46.7 5.1 9.2 0.0 47.0 4.5 10.5 0.0 
Student Behaviour in School Q3 36.9 5.5 6.7 0.0 40.3 4.9 8.3 0.0 
Student Behaviour in School Q2 15.7 4.9 3.2 0.0 20.6 4.3 4.8 0.0 
Academic Selection in School 49.7 4.2 12.0 0.0 44.7 3.7 12.2 0.0 
Deprived Pupil -11.8 5.7 -2.1 0.0 -9.1 5.0 -1.8 0.1 
Intercept 393.5 10.2 38.7 0.0 411.8 9.0 45.8 0.0 
Reference categories: Blue collar, low skilled; Two-parent family; Home possessions, Q1; Attitude to school, Q1; Student 
behaviour, Q1. 
In terms of schools, the first feature of note in Table 6.5 is that ceteris paribus both reading 
and mathematics scores were significantly lower for controlled, than for maintained, schools. The 
second feature of note is that both reading and mathematics scores were significantly raised by 
academic selection. The third feature of note is that both reading and mathematics scores were 
significantly lower in schools with bad student behaviour – schools in which student behaviour was in 
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the higher quintiles (Q4, Q3, Q2) did significantly better than schools in the lowest behaviour quintile 
(Q1, the reference category). 
In terms of pupils, the first feature of note in Table 6.5 was that ceteris paribus girls scored 
more highly in reading and boys scored more highly in mathematics. The second feature of note is 
that pupils with white collar high skilled parents had the highest, and pupils with blue collar low 
skilled parents had the lowest, reading and mathematics scores; similarly, pupils from single parent 
homes had significantly lower scores than children living with both parents. The third point of interest 
is that pupils with the best home educational resources had the highest, and pupils with the worst 
home educational resources had the lowest, reading and mathematics scores. The fourth point of 
interest is that pupils with the most positive attitude towards school had the highest, and pupils with 
the least positive attitude towards school had the lowest, reading and mathematics scores.  The final 
point of interest is that even after controlling for economic class, family structure, and home 
resources, there was still remained a significant role for ‘deprivation’ in terms of influencing 
academic performance.  In other words, these three factors – class, family, and resources, did not 
exhaust the totality of factors that contributed to pupil ‘deprivation’.  
6.7 Value-Added by Schools 
 An important issue in the context of post-primary education in Northern Ireland is the gap in 
educational performance between FSM and non-FSM pupils. This was highlighted in the previous 
chapter and again in section 6.5 of this chapter. The importance of closing this gap is recognised by 
government in Northern Ireland and, indeed, many of the current reforms to the school funding 
system are predicated on closing this gap.  In this section we propose a method for measuring, in 
terms of this gap, the value-added by Northern Ireland post-primary schools using two pieces of 
information that are available for every school: 
1. The proportion of NFSM and FSM of a school’s Year 12 pupils that obtain ‘good’ GCSEs. 
2.  The number of NFSM and FSM pupils in a school’s Year 12 class, 
Suppose there are N schools indexed (i=1…N) such that  and NFSM FSMi iM M are the number of 
NFSM and FSM pupils, respectively, in Year 12 in that school and  and NFSM FSMi iP P  are the average 
proportions of its NFSM and FSM  pupils in Year 12 achieving 5+ ‘good’ GCSEs and.  Then the 
average absolute performance gap (APG) between NFSM and FSM pupils in that school is defined 
by: 
 NFSM FSMi i iAPG P P= −   (6.15) 
However, judging schools purely by the size of their APG neglects levels of pupil performance; two 
schools may have the same APG, but pupils in one school could be performing at a higher level than 
in the other school.  To correct for this, each school’s APG is divided by the mean performance of its 
NFSM pupils,  NFSMiP  – that is, the overall proportion of its NFSM Year 12 pupils who obtained 
‘good GCSEs - to arrive at the performance gap ratio (PGR):  
 ii NFSM
i
APGPGR
P
=   (6.16) 
Equation (6.16) shows that, for a given APG, schools with a higher mean NFSM pupil performance 
will have a lower PGR.  
However, judging schools purely by the size of their PGR may also be misleading because it 
ignores the proportionate presence of FSM pupils in the school’s Year 12. Two schools may have the 
same APG, but one might have achieved it by restricting the entry of FSM pupils through selective 
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admission while the other school admitted FSM pupils more freely. Arguably, for the same PGR, the 
first school should be deemed to have a less commendable performance than the second.   If 
NFSM FSM
i i iK K K= +  represents the total number of pupils in Year 12 and 
FSM
i i iK Kα =  represents the 
proportion of FSM pupils in the school’s Year 12, the adjusted PGR (APGR) may be defined as: 
 i i ii NFSM FSM
i i i
PGR APG KAPGR
P Kα
= = ×   (6.17) 
From equation (6.17): ( )/ 0NFSMi i i iAPGR APG Pα∂ ∂ = − < ; the adjusted performance gap 
ratio decreases as the proportion of FSM students in the school’s Year 12 increases.  
  The question of what happens to the APGR when the ‘comparator’ performance level, 
NFSM
iP  changes involves a more complex answer.  On the one hand, the average performance gap, 
APGi , increases as NFSMiP  rises; on the other hand, the average performance gap as a percentage of 
the ‘comparator’ performance level, NFSMiP falls. To analyse the full effect note that, from equation 
(6.17):  
 2 2
(1 ) ( )NFSM FSM NFSM NFSM FSMi i i i i i i
NFSM NFSM NFSM NFSM
i i i i
APGR PGR P P P P P
P P P P
β β∂ ∂ − − − −
= = − =
∂ ∂       
  (6.18) 
Where in equation (6.18), above, 0FSM NFSMi iP Pβ = ∂ ∂ ≥ .  If β=0, then an increase in the performance 
of NFSM pupils has no impact on the performance of FSM pupils and: 
 2
) 0
FSM
i i
NFSM NFSM
i i
PGR P
P P
∂
= >
∂   
  (6.19) 
and the performance gap ratio rises with an improvement in the performance of non-FSM pupils. 
If β=1, then an increase in the performance of NFSM pupils is accompanied by an equivalent 
improvement in the performance of FSM pupils and: 
 2
( ) 0
NFSM FSM
i i i
NFSM NFSM
i i
PGR P P
P P
∂ − −
= <
∂   
  (6.20) 
 and the performance gap ratio falls with an improvement in the performance of non-FSM pupils. 
 The value of β for which the performance gap ratio neither rises nor falls with an 
improvement in the performance of non-FSM pupils is given by: 
 2
(1 ) ( ) 0
NFSM NFSM FSM FSM
i i i i i
NFSM NFSMNFSM
i ii
PGR P P P P
P PP
β
β
∂ − − −
= = ⇒ =
∂   
  (6.21) 
 From the above analysis, one can define the value added by a school, VAi, as the inverse of 
its adjusted performance gap ratio, APGRi: 
 [ ] 1
NFSM
i
i i i
i
PVA APGR
APG
α−= = ×   (6.22) 
  Contrary to the prior belief that in every school the performance of FSM pupils would not be 
as good as that of NFSM pupils, FSM NFSMi iP P<  there were 22 (out of 204) post-primary schools in 
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Northern Ireland in which the performance of FSM pupils, with respect to 5+ A*-C (E&M) GCSE 
passes, was at least as good as that of NFSM pupils ( 0FSM NFSMi i iP P APG≥ ⇒ ≤ ).  These 22 schools 
are identified in Table 6.6, below and, of these 22 schools, 18 were grammar schools (10 Protestant, 
eight Catholic); two were maintained; and two were grant maintained integrated.  The 10 Protestant 
grammars had a substantially lower proportion of year 12 FSM pupils than the eight Catholic 
grammars (5.2% versus 10.5%). 
 
Table 6.6: Schools in which NFSM pupils were outperformed by FSM pupils, 2013 
School Town Type % with 5+ A*-C (E&M) Year 12 numbers 
   NFSM FSM FSM  Total 
Strangford Integrated College Carrowdore GMI 32 45 11 91 
Cambridge House Grammar School Ballymena Grammar (P) 90 100 10 158 
Belfast High School Newtownabbey Grammar (P) 92 100 6 139 
Rainey Endowed School Magherafelt Grammar (P) 94 100 6 101 
The Royal School Dungannon Dungannon Grammar (P) 95 100 7 100 
Malone Integrated College Belfast GMI 18 22 36 133 
Lurgan College Craigavon Grammar (P) 95 100 8 119 
Grosvenor Grammar School Belfast Grammar (P) 96 100 6 163 
Portadown College Craigavon Grammar (P) 97 100 6 203 
Mount Lourdes Grammar School Enniskillen Grammar (C) 90 92 13 91 
St Dominic's High School Belfast Grammar (C) 98 100 15 142 
St Joseph's College Dungannon Maintained 21 24 34 94 
Banbridge Academy Banbridge Grammar (P) 98 100 7 194 
Ballymena Academy Ballymena Grammar (P) 98 100 7 181 
Collegiate Grammar School Enniskillen Grammar (P) 99 100 5 75 
Loreto Grammar School Omagh Grammar (C) 99 100 16 123 
St Mary's High School Downpatrick Maintained 57 58 12 73 
St Louis Grammar School Ballymena Grammar (C) 99 100 8 146 
Lumen Christi College Londonderry Grammar (C) 100 100 7 124 
St Joseph's Grammar School Dungannon Grammar (C) 100 100 10 76 
Our Lady's Grammar School Newry Grammar (C) 100 100 10 127 
St Mary's Grammar School Magherafelt Grammar (C) 100 100 16 165 
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There were 23 post-primary schools in which the performance of FSM pupils, though worse 
that of NFSM pupils ( 0FSM NFSMi i iP P APG≥ ⇒ ≤ ) with respect to 5+ A
*-C (E&M) GCSE passes, was 
within 10% of the latter’s performance.  These are shown in Table 6.7 and they comprise 17 Catholic 
schools: 11 Catholic grammars and six Catholic maintained schools. Of the remaining six schools, 5 
were Protestant grammars and one was a grant maintained integrated college.  
 
Table 6.7: Schools in which FSM pupils’ performance was less than 10% of NFSM 
performance, 2013 
School Town Type Yr 12 
FSM 
Yr 12 
total 
PGR 
St John's High School Omagh Maintained 12 32 1 
St Patrick's Grammar School Armagh Grammar (C) 12 116 1 
St Paul's High School Newry Maintained 41 251 1 
St Michael's Grammar Craigavon Grammar (C) 16 144 1 
St Rose's High School Belfast Maintained 30 68 5 
St Comhghall's College Enniskillen Maintained 19 59 3 
St Brigid's College Londonderry Maintained 78 127 8 
Slemish College Ballymena GMI 15 125 5 
Regent House School Newtownards Grammar (P) 9 218 3 
St Malachy's College Belfast Grammar (C) 15 160 3 
St Columb's College Londonderry Grammar (C) 37 208 4 
Limavady Grammar School Limavady Grammar (P) 16 139 4 
St Colman's High School Ballynahinch Maintained 16 62 9 
St Michael's College Enniskillen Grammar (C) 7 97 5 
Glenlola Collegiate Bangor Grammar (P) 13 163 4 
Dominican College Portstewart Grammar (C) 9 74 5 
St Patrick's Academy Dungannon Grammar (C) 22 200 5 
St Patrick's Grammar School Downpatrick Grammar (P) 13 95 5 
Wellington College Belfast Grammar (P) 9 122 6 
Sacred Heart Grammar School Newry Grammar (C) 13 121 6 
Thornhill College Londonderry Grammar (C) 31 200 6 
St Colman's College Newry Grammar (C) 10 135 6 
Christian Brothers Grammar School Newry Grammar (C) 8 136 7 
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Lastly, at the other end of the scale, Table 6.8 lists the 68 schools in which not a single FSM pupil 
managed to obtain a 5+ A*-C (E&M) GCSE pass. Of these 68 schools, 30 were controlled 
(secondary); 25 were maintained (secondary); 10 were Integrated; and three were Protestant 
grammars 
 
Table 6.8: Schools in which not a single FSM Pupil Obtained 5+ A*-C (E&M) GCSE Passes, 
2013 
School Town Type Yr 12 FSM Total Yr 12 NFSM 
Pass Rate 
Downshire School Carrickfergus Controlled 16 138 37 
Devenish College Enniskillen Controlled 11 92 35 
Newry High School Newry Controlled 14 74 50 
Blackwater Integrated College Downpatrick Integrated 12 68 37 
Ballyclare Secondary School Ballyclare Controlled 15 173 38 
Glastry College Newtownards Controlled 18 117 30 
Immaculate Conception College Londonderry Maintained 12 43 16 
St Brigid's High School Armagh Maintained 13 41 28 
St Patrick's High School Lisburn Maintained 10 85 54 
Larne High School Larne Controlled 15 103 22 
Larne Grammar School Larne Grammar (P) 6 110 89 
Markethill High School Armagh Controlled 11 103 46 
St Benedict's College Randalstown Maintained 20 94 43 
The High School Ballynahinch Ballynahinch Controlled 5 76 37 
Drumglass High School Dungannon Controlled 7 79 38 
St Joseph's College Coleraine Maintained 15 73 42 
St Columban's College Newry Maintained 14 55 42 
Carrickfergus College Carrickfergus Controlled 28 135 32 
Saintfield High School Saintfield Controlled 5 74 48 
Ballee Community High School Ballymena Controlled 22 72 19 
Newtownabbey Community High School Newtownabbey Controlled 17 58 50 
Ballymoney High School Ballymoney Controlled 28 143 33 
St Columba's College Newtownards Maintained 10 53 48 
Lisneal College Londonderry Controlled 33 157 32 
Hunterhouse College Belfast Grammar (P) 7 107 83 
Edmund Rice College Newtownabbey Maintained 32 119 33 
Coleraine College Coleraine Controlled 12 54 26 
Omagh High School Omagh Controlled 7 70 50 
St Columbanus' College Bangor Maintained 13 96 52 
St Mary's College Enniskillen Maintained 9 37 33 
Integrated College Dungannon Dungannon Integrated 17 83 47 
Magherafelt High School Magherafelt Controlled 16 122 27 
City Armagh High School Armagh Controlled 8 62 25 
Nendrum College Newtownards Controlled 12 89 34 
De La Salle High School Downpatrick Maintained 11 71 31 
Shimna Integrated College Newcastle Integrated 18 88 32 
Orangefield High School Belfast Controlled 21 55 16 
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New-Bridge Integrated College Banbridge Integrated 9 89 57 
St Patrick's College Londonderry Maintained 19 51 53 
St Patrick's College Dungannon Maintained 35 116 30 
St Joseph's College Enniskillen Maintained 9 40 61 
Our Lady of Mercy Girls' School Belfast Maintained 25 66 36 
Dundonald High School Belfast Controlled 13 67 22 
Drumcree College Portadown Maintained 9 52 16 
St Mary's High School Craigavon Maintained 18 69 21 
Drumragh College Omagh Integrated 11 105 62 
Cullybackey High School Ballymena Controlled 15 124 26 
Banbridge High School Banbridge Controlled 13 126 44 
Movilla High School Newtownards Controlled 22 97 20 
Fivemiletown college Fivemiletown Controlled 8 72 52 
North Coast Integrated College Coleraine Integrated 17 79 28 
Coleraine Academical Institution Coleraine Grammar (P) 7 123 80 
Brownlow Integrated College Craigavon Integrated 35 94 37 
Monkstown Community School Newtownabbey Controlled 31 138 18 
Castlederg High School Castlederg Controlled 20 84 26 
St Colm's High School Magherafelt Maintained 8 70 50 
Holy Trinity College Cookstown Maintained 32 102 45 
Little Flower Girls' School Belfast Maintained 25 109 41 
St Fanchea's College Enniskillen Maintained 12 55 37 
St Patrick's College Ballymena Maintained 12 106 44 
Laurelhill Community College Lisburn Controlled 14 165 42 
Dunluce High School Bushmills Controlled 19 108 21 
Erne Integrated College Enniskillen Integrated 17 72 49 
Priory College Holywood Integrated 20 91 35 
St Mary's High School Enniskillen Maintained 10 21 75 
St Joseph's Boys' High School Newry Maintained 21 78 46 
St Patricks & St Brigids High School Londonderry Maintained 18 107 64 
Sperrin Integrated College Magherafelt Integrated 7 82 53 
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6.6 Conclusions 
 Northern Ireland is praised as an education system which produces high performance levels. 
This is undoubtedly true for grammar school pupils. However it ignores the fact that only one-third of 
secondary school pupils obtain 5+ GCSE passes at A* - C grades, including English and Maths. It also 
conceals the level of inequality which children from disadvantaged backgrounds experience in 
accessing grammar schools. Structural reforms, proposed school closures and mergers into super-
schools will do little to address these problems. School improvement policies employed by the 
Department of Education have also made no impression on raising standards. This paper offers peer 
learning, a model based on stronger-weaker school links, as an alternative approach. The pilot shared 
education programme provides early evidence of trust building between schools which allows for peer 
learning to happen. The essential point is that parents make a choice on educational grounds rather 
than the heterogeneity of schools. While segregated schools sit uneasily with a desegregated 
workforce, poor educational standards fail to prepare pupils for employment, the greater of the two 
evils.  
Those persons, for whom schools have failed, particularly young Protestant males in socially 
disadvantaged areas, complain that there has been no ‘peace dividend’ in Northern Ireland or their life 
chances have not improved as a result of political stability. A desegregated schools system is unlikely 
to change this – poorly performing schools will not improve educationally by virtue of mixing with 
those from another religion. Since the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement in 1998 the data show that 
aside from Protestant secondary schools, Northern Ireland’s schools are becoming much more 
heterogeneous, although the Catholic school ethos and associated iconography still poses a problem 
for Protestants attending maintained schools. Shared education has helped to dissolve traditional 
school boundaries and create circumstances of trust which will allow effective peer learning to take 
place between schools. In so doing, education performance for all schools is likely to increase and 
quicken the pace of desegregation which offers societal benefits. An unequivocal focus on raising 
standards should be at the heart of the reform agenda in Northern Ireland schools. Segregated 
schooling is much less of an issue than popular belief would imply. 
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